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ABSTRACT
Ratcheting  Labor Standards (RLS) is a regulatory  altemative that aims to improve the
social performance  of firms in the global economy. Under RLS, firms disclose to a
certified monitor information  on their social performance,  minimally including working
conditions,  hours, and wages.  The monitors rank firms on the basis of their current social
performance  and their rates of improvement  and make these rankings, and the methods
on which they are based, accessible  to the public. This process, it is argued, encourages
leading firms to strive toward superior social practices. Competition among firms and
monitors will help establish  two kinds of standards:  best practices defined by the most
advanced firms and rates of improvement shown to  be feasible at various levels of
development.  Both continually  "ratchet" upward as the best practices get better still and
firms find ways to accelerate  improvement,  in a race to the top. These and other RLS
mechanisms  would create incentives  for firms to dedicate a portion of the ingenuity and
resources  now devoted to product development  to the continuous improvement  of labor
practices.RATCHETING LABOR STANDARDS:
REGULATION  FOR CONTINUOUS  IMPROVEMENT  IN TBIE GLOBAL
WORKPLACE
I.  INTRODUCTION'
Transformations  in the global economy have outpaced traditional labor laws and
regulatory institutions.  As firms decentralize their decision-making over sprawling supply
chains and investments flit across national borders, they undermine what regulatory order
there was  in the  world's  labor markets.  Partly as a  consequence, the present wave of
globalization has given rise to widespread abuses, including child labor, punishingly long
work  days,  harsh  discipline,  hazardous  work  conditions,  sexual  predation,  and
suppression of the  freedom to  associate  and organize. These forms of servitude recall
outright slavery in  some instances, and provoke moral outrage the world over whenever
they come to light.
There is broad  agreement among the world's  publics that labor markets must be
re-regulated  to  curb  these abuses.  This  deep consensus is captured in the  core labor
standards adopted by the International Labour Organization (ILO), and ratified, or being
considered  for ratification,  by  its member  countries. Other intemational organizations,
including the World Bank, increasingly accept some responsibility for promoting several
core standards, although they do not explicitly endorse them. Core labor standards recast
a more elaborate corpus of regulation previously promulgated by the ILO into a compact
list of incontestable  human rights of the workplace, including freedom of association, the
right to organize and bargain collectively, prohibition of forced and child labor, and non-
discrimination in employment.  These standards - which were recently advanced through
the ILO's  "Declaration  of the Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work" - express the
' This essay has been prepared as a discussion draft; we expect that discussion  will result in substantial
revision. We would like to especially  thank Sean Cooney,  Ashraf Ghani,  Robert  Holzmann,  Yevgeny  N.
Kuznetsov,  Michael  J. Piore, and two anonymous  reviewers  for incisive  commentary  on previous  versions
of this paper. Many of the ideas here derive in part from on-going collaborative  work on deliberative
democracy and emergent regulatory  forms with Joshua Cohen, Michael Dorf, and Bradley Karkkainen,
among others. The findings, interpretations  and conclusions  expressed  in this paper are entirely  those of
the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the aforementioned  individuals  or the World
Bank,  to its affiliated  organizations,  or to the members  of its Board of Executive  Directors  or the countries
they representpublic's  moral  convictions  about  the  respect  due  to  labor  as  a  partner  in  global
production, and its determination that these convictions be honored. The open and crucial
question, then, is how to construct a regulatory framework that protects vulnerable groups
against the abuses identified in core labor standards?
One  common  response  entrusts  monitoring  of  compliance  to  national  and
international governmental  agencies,  and, perhaps,  trade  unions and non-governental
organizations.  Some  influential  organizations  in  the  US  labor  movement  favor  this
solution, and hope to play an active role in the administrative and adjudicative institutions
that it would create.
The  appeal  of  this  model  lies  in  its  evocation  of  a  familiar,  fixed-rule
understanding  of  regulation  and  law:  society  defines  certain  acts  as  criminal  or
unconscionable,  and  those  who  commit  them  are  punished.  Gaps  in  the  rules  are
presumed to be correctable by judges  and administrators.  While this approach may work
with their  elaborate rule systems and enforcement agencies  of the developed  countries,
the intrinsic ambiguities  of core standards can overwhelm their application in the global
context.
To  begin,  how  would  a  system  that  relies  on  monitoring  by  formal  labor
organizations  come  to  grips  with  the largely  informal  economies  of the  third  world,
where  many  sectors  have  few  legally  registered  factories,  let  alone  official  worker
representatives,  and  where those  labor organizations  that  do  exist often  collude  with
government  or business? How, given complexities of process and circumstance,  would it
address environmental  problems at the workplace  and in  local communities?  And how
can core standards  respond to  child labor, where  simple prohibitions,  if  enforced,  can
push children  out of abusive factory work into outright prostitution? Even in advanced
countries,  moreover,  with their  entrenched monitoring  regimes and  established  rule of
law traditions,  homework  and other informal  forms  of "sweated"  labor are  spreading.
Given that  monitoring  tasks will be more difficult in the  developing world  than in the
developed  and that  background conditions  are generally  less favorable  there,  how can
traditional  systems  that are increasingly  strained even in  their home precincts  hope to
meet  vast  new  burdens?  Finally  and  perhaps  most  crucially,  critics  of  these  labor
standards  charge that  they amount to trade  protectionism  for the developed  countries,
2would restrict  economic activity  in developing  areas,  and  thus  ultimately  harm  those
populations  that  they  are  designed  to  protect.  How  can  labor  standards  protect  the
interests of these workers while nevertheless promoting  development?  Without answers
to these questions, core standards could become no more  than an  expression  of public
outrage  and  a  symbol-as  though  an  additional  sign  were  needed-of  the  limits  of
traditional forms of govermnent.
An alternative approach sidesteps these customary standard setting bodies. It uses
the pressure of public opinion and financial markets to move multinational firms to adopt
"codes of conduct" in which they promise that their own intemal units and their suppliers
will adhere to various labor, environmental, and social standards. More and more, large
firns  such as Nike and Reebok have allowed consulting and accounting firms-and  more
recently NGOs-to  conduct social performance audits to verify that their operations obey
these  codes  of  conduct.  Suppliers  found  to  be  out  of  compliance  are  sometimes
sanctioned with order reductions or contract cancellations. To serve this emerging market
for social  performance  monitoring,  organizations in  North  America  and  Europe  have
begun  to  define general  standards for  corporate  labor  practices  and  certify  numerous
third-party monitors as competent to audit compliance with them. 2 The appeal of this
approach  is  that  it  creates  incentives  for  prominent  firms  to  increase  their  social
performance and, as they do so, generates de facto  standards with which to criticize firms
with poor labor practices.
But this course too has obvious limits. First, public  pressure may move only the
most  conscientious  or  publicly  exposed  corporations.  Second  and  worse,  the  open
character of these voluntary codes invites  abuse of the public trust.  An  unscrupulous
company, or one that  is simply indifferent to labor conditions  in its  subcontracts, need
only  adopt  (or  affiliate  with  a  standard-setting body  that  adopts)  a  version  of  core
standards  that  emphasizes  vaguely  framed  intentions  to  improve,  rather  than  good
performance, and then retain pliant monitors to testify that the corporations'  motives are
sincere. Such captured monitors would make voluntary  codes at best  a  form  of public
relations for powerful multinationals and at worst a misleading  seal of approval  affixed
by those with no legitimate claim to judge these matters.
2 For a fuller backgroumd  on core standards and codes of conduct see Appendix A.
3In what follows, we propose a framework called Ratcheting Labor Standards  to
make good on the  commitments of  core labor codes. Like the metaphorical ratchet
wrench we invoke, the framework  attempts to set into motion a process that begins with
the dismal  labor outcomes  often found in the facilities worldwide,  and then gradually,  but
systematically  move them upwards. The standards are based initially upon the best that
current performance offers, the regulatory frame compels facility-level improvements,
and then re-sets standards at that new, elevated level of realized performance. The
ratcheting-rule framework recognizes (like  voluntary codes)  that  we  have  limited
knowledge  of the diverse needs of workers in developing  countries and of feasible  social
performance, but  aims  nonetheless  (like  other  traditional  proposals) to  provide
enforceable  standards  backed by sanctions.
RLS embodies three central dynamics: public transparency, comparison and
evaluation, and  continuous  improvement. Transparency  begins  from  the  simple
requirement  of public disclosure  of factory  performance  conditions.  Firms are responsible
for rating their own social performance-their  treatment of workers, the community and
the environment-on  condition  that their ratings be subject to credible  public review, and
provided in a way that allows comparison of conditions and efforts to improve them. In
this information  regime, firms first develop and implement their own  means of enhancing
labor and social performance.  In return for this freedom of initiative,  however,  they must
report their methods and outcomes to organizations, accredited with an international
body, which can both certify that firms actually carried out the investigations  reported
and rank the social performance  of the firm against its peers. The accredited,  certifying
organizations  would in turn supply sufficient information about their certification  and
ranking  practices to the public and superordinate  bodies so that their performance  could
be compared. Thus forgiving  inspections by firms, their agents, or monitoring entities
can be distinguished  from demanding ones.
These ranldngs would produce a two-sided competition:  Firms confident of their
outstanding social performance would seek  out  verifying organizations demanding
enough  to value their accomplishments;  the best verifiers would want to demonstrate  and
hone their evaluative skills by working with the outstanding social performers.  The
medium-term  result would be the production of enough information about how firms
4actually perform socially, and how to improve that performance,  to allow definition  of
effective  baseline regulatory standards,  including,  crucially, standards for improvement.
As time goes on these baselines  would be revised  to reflect new possibilities.  Put another
way, enforceable  yet corrigible standards are the product-not  the starting point-of  a
process in which monitors constitute  themselves  as effective  actors even as they come to
understand more precisely the ends towards which monitoring  is directed. The desire of
global publics, organized as consumers, advocacy groups, and governments,  to abolish
horrific labor conditions  drives this sirnultaneous  competition  for social performance  and
monitoring  integrity.
This proposal grows out of three overlapping sets of developments. First and
most  obviously,  it  formalizes  and  makes  transparent-and  thus  effective-the
sophisticated  efforts at self-monitoring  already underway. It allows firms that respond  to
public pressure  in good faith,  but in different  ways, to demonstrate  their accomplishments
credibly, without requiring agreement from the beginning on common standards and
assessment  protocols.
Second and more broadly, RLS builds on the re-organization  of production  and
supply chains that constitute the current wave of decentralization:  the system extends
those forms of disciplined self-monitoring integral to  competitive success in  world
markets to labor and labor-related  domains. That is why, as we will see, leading firms in
sectors such as footwear and apparel, aware that the costs of proceeding  fiurther  down a
familiar path are low (and may indeed bring surprising  benefits)  have begun to increase
the reach of process-control and quality-assurance regimes in just  this way. Public
disclosure  of these improvements  makes their experience  available  and compelling  to less
advanced  firms in the formal  sector and to firms  in the informal  sector as well.
Third and most generally,  the effort to construct a system of rolling rules for
labor standards is inspired by, and borrows from, recent regulatory  innovations  that are
themselves responses to  changes in  the  economic environment analogous to  those
relevant  here. In areas such as industrial toxics control and pollution  prevention,  nuclear
power  generation,  the  restoration  and  governance  of  natural  habitats,  and  the
management  of large-scale  ecosystems  in the United States-as  well as in the workplace
and labor  markets-fixed-rule regulation  has been frustrated  by the inability of regulators
5to match the pace of change, complexity, and diversity of their targets (Weber 1999,
Sabel et. al. 1999, Fung and O'Rourke 2000, World Bank 1999). One common response
has been to develop rolling rule systems that enable producers or other parties to select
improved performance and monitoring methods; in return, the regulated entity must
reveal these practices and their outcomes to the regulator.  Typically this information
pooling is accomplished  by an entity responsive  to but independent from the regulated
actors, which organizes peer-reviews and compares  the results to generate rolling rules
and procedures  that become  standards for all. In the most fully developed  systems-as  in
the  regulation of the US nuclear-power generating industry, for example-regulated
entities  are further  judged by their ability to respond  to improvements  developed  by peers
or the pooling center (Reese 1994). From this perspective, a rolling-standard  regime of
labor  regulation is  not  a  contrivance necessary to  accommodate the  institutional
deficiencies of developing countries, but rather a step towards the creation of a labor-
standards  regime that takes account  of current circumstance.
The body of this essay elaborates  the claim that a regime built on the principles
underpinning these successes can yield effective enforcement of core labor standards
where fixed rules and voluntary codes cannot. Section II characterizes  the current wave
of  decentralization and globalization according to  the  organization of firms. Rising
demands for quality and timely delivery in the world markets requires firms to adopt an
ensemble of  disciplines that make  competition in  social standards and monitoring
methods not only workable  but competitively  attractive  for the good performers among
them. Section m sets out the principles of Ratcheting Labor Standards and shows how
they create continuously more demanding standard by  organizing this  competition.
Section IV argues that current developments in labor-standard  monitoring  in the formal
sector are  converging into a  rolling-rule enforcement regime  consistent with  these
principles. Section V makes a similar argument, more speculatively, for the informal
sector. We conclude by showing  how the proposed  regime creates places for firms, trade
unions, NGO's, national regulatory entities and international organizations  such as the
ILO, World Bank and WTO  to exercise  their authority  together to give force to the public
consensus  for labor standards.
6II.  THE ECONOMIC  BASIS OF GLOBALIZATION:  REGULATORY  ROAD
BLOCKS AND  OPPORTUNITIES
The current wave  of globalization  at once undermines  conventional  approaches  to
labor standards regulation, yet creates opportunities for the RLS alternative. As with
previous waves of globalization  and decentralization,  the search for ever cheaper labor
drives the  current relocation of  production to  the  abundant supply of  workers in
developing countries.  What distinguishes the contemporary movement is the need to
integrate cheap labor into production systems that deliver high-quality,  precisely timed
delivery  of components  and goods, and rapid product innovations.  At the same time,  the
globalization  of information  and transnational  advocacy  campaigns  has allowed labor  and
human  rights activists to raise public awareness  about broad social concerns and to even
target  individual factory problems. These  multiple dynamics  give  rise  to  novel
relationships  between retailers, large-multinational  firms, and their tiers of suppliers in
both the  formal and informal sectors of developing economies, as well as between
producers  and consumers. It is these new relations  that directly create the possibility  for
RLS in the formal sector and, through secondary  effects, buttress  them in the informal
sector  as well.
Changes in the Formal Sector
Instead  of  arms-length  decentralization  in  which  relationships  are  made  and
broken solely on the basis of wage levels, producer relationships  under contemporary
globalization are based upon careful assessments of the desirability of firms as potential
partners,  able to provide  not only cheap labor, but product and process improvements  that
increase the competitiveness  of the whole production chain (Gereffi 1996, Helper and
Sako 1995, Sako 1996; Abemathy et. al. 1999). Large firms decentralize in order to
undertake a kind  of co-development in which work teams and sub-contractors  not only
suggest the means to reach given ends, but propose what those ends should be. Though
low-level  tasks in which workers mechanically  complete tasks given them by managers
remain all too common in many production processes, the "globalization"  of production
increasingly means decentralized co-development (Helper et. al. 1998).
7To  coordinate these  relationships, improve  them,  and  know  when  some
partnerships  ought to be terminated in favor of more productive  ones, firms engaged in
co-development  must monitor the capacities and actions of their collaborators with a
previously unimagined scope and attention to  detail. The risky nature of  globalized
collaboration  creates a premium for knowing which collaborators  are capable of what,
and beyond that whether they can improve in tandem by working with one another.
Hence leading  firms in various industries  go to extraordinary  lengths  to qualify their sub-
contractors. Practices vary  by  sector of  the  economy, but typically suppliers must
demonstrate  their ability to set goals and detect implementation  shortfalls  ("saying what
you do  and  doing  what you  say"). The ISO  family of  standards (ISO 9000  for
mnanufacturing,  ISO 14000  for environmental  practices)  on which several  of the voluntary
codes  mentioned  above are modeled,  measure  just this ability. ISO certification  is widely
regarded  as a basic qualification  for collaborative  production.
More demanding customers and suppliers frequently exchange or "co-locate"
engineers and other personnel in order to assure a rich exchange of information about
design and production problems. The most sophisticated fimns  periodically rank their
suppliers  with regard to their abilities as co-developers  and their attractiveness  as more
extensive  collaborators. Finally, as the production  and hence collaboration  requirements
change, so too do the needs for evaluation. Supplier rankings are thus accompanied  by
continuing  debates among firms over monitoring  and evaluation  methods. Leading  firms
therefore periodically re-evaluate the  performance and potential of  their upper tier
suppliers;  and suppliers in consequence  are required to demonstrate  growing capabilities
in order  to rise in the hierarchy of tiers.
The significance of these linkages for contemporary  globalization  is manifest in
the influence  of the largest and most sophisticated  suppliers, the so-called "first-tier."  In
contemporary  footwear production,  for example, the largest supplier is a Taiwanese  firm
called Pou Chen. This Taiwanese conglomerate produces for virtually all of the well-
known  sports  shoe  merchandisers, such  as  Nike,  Reebok,  Adidas,  Fila,  Puma,
Timberland,  etc., and so is not overly dependent  on any of them. The CEO of Pou Chen
has bragged  that one in six humans on the planet wear shoes made by the company.  Pou
Chen and other first tier suppliers have become expert in plant layout and design for
8manufacturability  to meet performance standards while cutting  production costs. These
suppliers engage in extensive co-development of products and production processes with
their  household-branded  end-producers,  while  simultaneously  carefully  managing
relationships with their own downstream suppliers in multiple developing countries. One
precedent  for  this  structure  of  global  organization  comes  from  circuit  board
manufacturing.  In the last decade  and half, the leading  suppliers  moved  from  simply
"stuffing"  boards to their customer's  exact specification to jointly  developing  complex
and rapidly changing products like personal computers and manufacturing those products
with advanced logistical systems.
Another manifestation, unprecedented as far as we know, is the organization of
manufacturing  into  enormous  production  complexes.  The  combination  of  elaborate
performance  demands and  labor  intensive  production has  been  solved  by  combining
thousands  of workers  with large, multinational  managerial  staffs into  assembly plants
whose size rivals those from the age of vertically integrated mass production  factories.
For  example,  Frenkel  (1999)  documents  one  footwear plant  in  southem  China  that
employs 4,600  workers and  another that  employs  8,000.  Pou  Chen  runs  plants  with
60,000 workers and more. Unlike the earlier industrial age, however, these plants operate
in  a  decentralized  environment in  which their workers  often assemble  parts  imported
from elsewhere. Furthermore, the lines within contemporary factories are also subject to
frequent reorganization  to  accommodate process and product  innovations,  and  overall
operations obey exacting logistical disciplines.
Globalization and the Informal Sector
The "informal sector" of semi-legal production groups a vast range of activities:
women  pieceworkers  stitching  baseball  covers  for  a  US-Honduran  company  under
subcontract;  street  vendors, often  with  ties to  established  commercial  outlets,  selling
foodstuffs and  piece goods to the poor  and the middle  class; skilled  artisans working
wood, stone, metal or plastic with simple machines; brick-makers burning old tires to fuel
crude kilns in order to supply small construction sites, to name only a few. Much of this
activity is undertaken for the sake of subsistence, but hardly all. Although exact numbers
are hard  to  come by,  evidence suggests that  informal-sector  workers  in  general,  and
9home-based women workers  in  particular, account  for  a  significant share of  the
workforce  in the export industry  of developing  countries (Chen, Sebstad,  O'Conell 1999).
The transformation  of global supply chains recasts these activities  directly and
indirectly. Directly, some of  the  components and  sub-assemblies used in  the large
facilities mentioned above can  instead be manufactured in  the  informal sector, for
example  by women in outlying  villages or small firms operating in the shadow  of the law.
This  second  level of  production decentralization-from  large  firms  in  developing
countries to  informal workers there-is  governed by the  same logistical and quality
demands  that govern global  production generally.  Formal sector customers  typically  meet
their quality and timeliness requirements by shifting the costs of failure to the informal
sector producers. Usually, this  means high rates of rejection, large inventories, and
consequently  lower incomes.
The most ambitious  and capable among  these producers,  however, understand  that
their own progress depends upon mastering the same disciplines of process control,
monitoring,  and innovation  that yield such large returns for their formal-sector  partners.
Already, informal sector  operators are  becoming familiar with  ISO  9000 and  its
underlying principles just as many of them gained expertise in second-hand  machinery
long ago. The distance between the formal and informal sectors is thus not as great as it
might at first appear, many informal producers are connected  to global  production  chains
not  only  through  regular  cooperative exchanges, but  also  potentially  by  deeper
organizational  practices that bridge the divide and may allow the most able informal
firms  to cross it.
At the same time, the entry of transnational firms and their commodities  into
developing nations exerts indirect pressures on the informal sector. First, competition
from world-class firms often  pushes weak domestic producers, perhaps previously
shielded by protectionist measures, into the informal sector of lower quality, but less
expensive,  goods. Second,  the strain on vulnerable  local producers is further  increased  by
flows of second-hand  clothing,  textiles,  and other goods from richer economies  (the result
of liberalization  of trade and higher living standards  in the exporters). This wider  array of
product choices, in turn, increases the market power and schools the tastes of even the
poorest consumers,  and so forces the street retailers who serve them to aggressively  seek
10out higher-quality, more fashionable merchandise. The upshot of these direct and indirect
effects is that globalization undoes the unwritten rules of the informal sector-the  social
conventions  and  practices  framing  wages,  business  relationships,  and  working
conditions-just  as  it  undoes  much  in  the  written  agreements  governing  the  formal
sector.
Why  Conventional  Approaches Will  Fail
The  changes  canvassed  above  undermine  conventional  regulatory  efforts  to
secure  decent  working  conditions  first  and  most  directly  by  their  scope.  The  most
effective regulatory bodies belong to national governments, but the subjects they seek to
regulate  are  by  definition  intemational,  sprawling  across  the  globe.  At  most,  these
national authorities can enforce labor standards by rejecting goods that they identify as
having been produced under sub-standard  conditions (as in the Fair Labor Standards Act
of the United States). Such regulation is bound to be haphazard in its ability to improve
worldwide working conditions, and raises questions about the degree to which standards
developed in one country-say  a wealthy industrialized one-are  appropriate for another
whose central problem is economic development.
The constant re-organization of production within firms and across supply chains
poses a second obstacle to conventional  regulatory approaches. As  firms respond more
and more to their markets on one side and decentralize authority to contractors and work
teams on the other, it becomes increasingly difficult to maintain an  industrial relations
regime or  labor regulation  system  based  on  fixed  standards.  As  local units  use  their
discretion to solve their particular problems, they inevitably violate externally determined
general  rules.  A reflection  of  this  tendency  is that  collective  bargaining  agreements
setting job  definitions, subcontracting limits, and work time in the developed economies
have been substantially relaxed in recent years to allow diverse solutions to a common
problem even within the same firm. Why would developing countries have an easier time
accommodating these incessant changes?
These perturbing  effects of  continuous  re-organization  might, perhaps,  be  met
with labor regulations that use a least-common-denominator  of labor standards were it
not for a third problem  of fixed-rule  regimes: they require  extensive inspectorates and
11other administrative capacities to monitor firms, sanction violators, and counter their
evasion efforts. Even in  the  advanced industinalized  countries, regulators lack these
capacities  and are searching for alternative  models  and methods (Esbenshade  1999, Weil
1999). The  regulatory  capacities  of  developing countries  rest  on  much  shakier
foundations. Furthermore, they face the daunting challenges posed by informality; in
many of these nations, large shares  of the workforce  are unregistered  and by definition  do
not benefit from official  labor standards  or inspection  efforts.
These three difficulties feed and are compounded  by a fourth: the problem of
unintended  consequences. When  authorities impose  prohibitions  or  performance
requirements  upon distant and complexly interconnected  producers,  enforcement efforts
can easily thwart the original aims of regulators.  For example, regulatory  demands may
drive firms from the  formal to  the  informal sector in  their efforts to  avoid costly
compliance,  and thus make further abuses  harder to detect, much less to correct Bans on
child labor illustrate  this dynamic dramatically.  Outright  prohibitions  on child labor often
force children  out of factories  only to drive them into deeper  poverty or the sex industry.
Foundations for  a Regulatory Alternative
But these same pressures that frustrate conventional  regulatory efforts can serve
as the building blocks for an alternative approach based upon the core principle of
globalization  itself: continuous competitive  innovation  driven by public comparisons  of
firm performance  in which outstanding  enterprises  set the par.
Consider the formal sector. Many of the units in contemporary supply chains
embody substantial fixed investments to satisfy their demanding quality and logistical
requirements. These plants may be footloose by the standards of developed economy
corporations.  But they are rooted compared  to traditional  sweatshops  which have no fixed
costs at all. (In the classic garment-industry  sweatshop,  seamstresses  rent the machines
the use from the firm owner and are paid by the piece. The fabric parts to be sewn are the
even thread with which to sew it are supplied  by the customer. The firm owner rents the
premises with a short-term lease.) Recall the large footwear facilities discussed above.
Relocating these facilities and recreating these relationships is expensive. Therefore,
12firms prefer to comply with labor regulations when it is not too costly to do so. This
creates  the possibility  of regulation  despite  the continuing  possibilities of flight.
Second,  a rolling rule regime makes compliance costs bearable by building upon
the capacities of reorganization  and learning that firns  have already developed  in the
course of competition.  It begins by asking them to extend their ingenuity, honed for the
purposes of improving  product quality and variety, to the problems of labor conditions
and social performance  generally.  Beyond this, regulators will demand only that firms
meet the social standards  that pioneers  like them have already achieved,  and so ask firms
to  exercise their benchmarking and learning abilities. Because it  builds upon these
familiar disciplines  and  demands  demonstrably feasible  levels  of  performance,
compliance  with a ratcheting  regime is manifestly less costly than adherence  to abstract
and uniform standards formulated by distant agencies. As we shall see shortly, many
firms and supplier clusters have already begun to integrate various social performance
standards  and improvement  routines  into their internal quality control efforts.
Consider next the informal sector. Operators who participate in global supply
chains,  perhaps  by providing  inputs  to formal sector firms, have incentives  to improve  the
social performance  in order to improve their standing in their production hierarchy. On
one  hand,  compliance with  labor  standards  is  a  condition  of  participation and
advancement.  On the other, developing  the capacities  that allow one to learn and improve
on social  performance  dimensions  will likely enhance competitive  quality,  logistical,  and
innovative  capacities as well. A central  task of economic development is to make the
prospects of such advancement  from informal to formal sectors credible. In this sense,
regulating  labor standards  in the informal sector is a component of advancing  economic
development  overall,  and efforts toward  the former strengthen  the latter as well.
For informal sector operators  who do not participate in these supply chains, the
keys to regulation lie in proximity to home and work life. Whereas these are typically
distinct in the advanced  economies,  they are closely intertwined in the informal sector.
Adults often work alongside  children  and other family members, and the workplace  may
be adjacent  to, or a part of, the home. This means that environmental  or health and safety
problems at  work are  almost inevitably also  problems for  the  household and the
community. Conversely, efforts to  improve  community life  by  cleaning up  the
13environment  or  reducing  other  hazardous  conditions  almost  inevitably  require
interventions  at the workplace.  Therefore, community  development  efforts often become
in part efforts to improve labor conditions and standards. As we shall see below, the
ability of ratcheting regimes to discover and diffuse innovations  is particularly suited to
these efforts  because they typically  occur against diverse backgrounds of  political
uncertainty  and uneven  local capacities and resources.
Finally, firms and informal operators  that agree to incorporate  social performance
as part of their regular innovation  efforts and to compare  themselves against one another
in this way would potentially  ease the path for regulators  as well. Instead of aspiring to
the impossibility of inspecting  hundreds of thousands of facilities (or homes) scattered
across dozens of countries,  a public authority on this alternative approach would gather
data that was generated and collected primarily by firms in the course of developing or
monitoring their quality and social-improvement  programs. This obviously brings up
many difficulties in the veracity of the information  and of enforcement,  and we shall turn
to those in  a moment  The central proposition here, however, is that by developing
regulatory  demands  that are compatible  with the fundamental  operating  routines of global
producers, regulators can enlist those firms in its efforts to improve social performance
and so share the  burdens of  formulating standards, monitoring them, and  even of
enforcement.
None of these outcomes-the  social improvement of firms or the adoption of a
regulatory  frame that builds  upon the drivers of globalization-is  automatic.  A few firms,
highly vulnerable to  public retaliation and  versed in  the  disciplines of  continuous
reorganization, find it cheaper  to adopt effective, labor practices than to run the risk of
scandal. But firms that are less capable or less exposed, such as those who do not
participate  in global supply  chains, whose customers  are other businesses,  and those with
lower  public profiles,  may hesitate to follow suit. A regime of global  labor regulation  will
only become effective if it can  expand the incentives and dynamics that govem the
former  group to discipline  the latter. The next section  shows  how a system of rolling rule
labor standards can do  just that.
14III.  THE DESIGN  OF ROLLING  RULE LABOR  REGULATION
The core idea of ratcheting labor regulation, as we said at the outset, is to compel
firms to compete publicly with  one another  to improve their  social performance. In its
fullest version,  every firm regulated  under  this regime  would report wages,  workforce
profiles,  environmental  and  labor  management  systems, and  other  elements of  social
performance  to  a  certified  monitor.  Each  monitor  then  unifies reports  and  ranks  the
overall  performance  of  firms  under  its  purview.  Monitors  would  then  make  these
rankings  and the methods  used  to  derive  them  publicly  available.  The reputation  and
credibility  of monitors  would  be  built  upon  public  evaluations of their  capacities  for
evaluating and improving their member  firms. The information provided by this system
allows  the  public  acting  as  consumers,  in  interest  groups,  and through  their  national
governments  to  put  firms  and  monitors  under  complementary  competitive  pressures.
Firms  thus  seek  highly  regarded  monitors  to  elevate  their public  standing.  Monitors
would seek out the most sincere and capable firms and encourage their member firms to
adopt  best  practices  in  order  build  their  reputations  and  expand  their  influence.
Consumers  and  others  would  be  able  to  distinguish  leaders  from  laggards  in  social
performance.  Under  this  system,  responsible  films  could  assume  that  their  behavior
would  be  rewarded  and  irresponsible  ones  would  fear  embarrassment,  pressure
campaigns, and official sanctions.
A second effect, resulting  from competition,  is continuous improvement in labor
and other social practices. Laggard firms that seek refuge in less demanding regimes are
called to account by  invoking the documented achievements of leaders. But even good
performers who choose  rigorous  monitoring  will find that  some are better  still, and so
they will try  and improve their  rankings  by  emulating or leapfrogging them.  Thus the
same framework of comparisons that raises the bar for bad performers pushes good ones
as well.
Third, this process establishes  standards that are inherently feasible because they
are derived from field-proven practices of best performers. No one can dismiss them as
the dreams of idealists because established competitors are already complying with them.
Fourth  and  relatedly,  the  framework  accommodates  great diversity  in political
conditions,  commumity capacities,  and sectoral circumstances. Since requirements upon
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performance,  the  regime  incorporates contextual considerations  automatically  as
monitors and publics select  appropriate boundaries  for cobmparison  and ranking. There is
a world of difference between an advanced manufacturing  facility with 5,000 workers
and a village-based  piecework  operation  with a dozen;  the rolling-rule monitoring  regime
acknowledges  these contrasts  in its fundamental  design.
Fifth, because the social performance  of a firm in RLS is compared with others
economically and socially like itself, but not necessarily subject to the same political
jurisdiction, the system is not easily bent to protectionist  purposes.  If some firms in a
developing economy can  document superior social performance, or  rapid rates  of
improvement,  it is hard for the political authorities  to claim, for example, that the very
idea of  elaborating labor standards of  any kind is  inherently designed to  exclude
domestically produced goods from international markets.  By the  same token, this
variation of performance  within developing economies,  combined with variation in the
developed  ones, makes it harder for govenmments  in the latter to use labor standards as a
pretext for banning imports from entire nations.  Put another way, by dis-aggregating
national economies  into diverse  groups of firms with differing trajectories,  RLS makes it
harder-but  not,  of  course, impossible-to  build the  political  coalitions that  can
transform  the fight for or against  standards  into an instrment  of national trade policy.
Finally, the system  also provides  the basis for elaborating  a framework  of baseline
social performance levels and procedures over time. In the first instance, there will be
many diverse and contending  practices and standards among monitors and firms. Over
time, however, some routines  will become widespread  and accepted as so basic that all
sincere and capable firm should  adopt them. These routines would then become  minirnal
in the sense that all firms participating  in the rolling rule regimne  would be required to
adopt them.
Though  RLS offers compelling  advantages  over fixed standards,  it may seem less
desirable  on  three  counts: its  scope  of  application, its  ability  to  negotiate  the
adversarialism  inherent  in efforts  to improve  labor  practices,  and its complexity.
Regarding scope, RLS is  in part inspired by  a promising dynamic in  which
consumers in high income countries demand products made with good labor practices
16and large firms respond by improving their treatment of workers, incorporating these
priorities  into their supply-chain  management  practices,  and retaining third-party  auditors
to verify that they have responded effectively.  Many markets-such  as informal sector
production,  business-to-business  commodities,  and production for domestic  consumption
in developing  countries-lack  such ethically inclined consumers. If RLS's scope is to
extend beyond a limited number of high-profile  consumer multinationals,  other parties
must pressure firms in these arenas to  improve their labor practices. This again is a
serious challenge. However, by enhancing the publicity and quality of monitoring of
labor practices  through dedicated  institutions  and regulatory requirements,  RLS expands
social competition  beyond its currently limited range by inviting an array of parties to
press less visible firms to behave more ethically. This framework potentially creates
broad opportunities  for local community groups, labor organizations, official regulatory
agencies, investors and other financial market actors to  drive RLS competition by
motivating  firms that lie beyond  the view or reach of wealthy  consumers.
Another objection grows out of  an important difference between efforts to
improve product quality, such as through ISO 9000, and to  improve labor practices.
Labor conditions  are frequently distributive and adversarial contests, rather than clear
win-win opportunities for managers. Because of  this  difference, the  organizational
disciplines  of continuous improvement  may not seem relevant to labor practices. RLS
bridges this gap in two ways. First, solutions  to many workplace concerns can be bought
cheaply-for  a modicum of management  attention and flexibility-and  do not require
demanding  distributive  trade-offs.  One labor-management  effort to improve  conditions  in
an Indonesian footwear facility, for example, revealed that some of the most pressing
concerns such  as  workplace temperature, ventilation, noise,  occupational safety,
ergonomics,  and protective equipment could be addressed at very modest cost (IHS
1999).  In this regard, many labor practice improvements  resemble pollution prevention
initiatives that  frequently yield  mutual gains solutions (Massachusetts Toxics Use
Reduction  Program 1997).  RLS motivates firms to constantly seek out these solutions.
Outside  of this cooperative  zone, RLS takes advantage  of the variance between firms. In
any development  context,  some workers are treated better than others on the distributive
dimensions  of work hours, compensation,  and benefits. The comparative framework of
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on their behavior, while identifying those that perform poorly for additional official or
informal  sanction. Finally, this framework  may appear  too complex  to work. Why should
there be two competitions,  one for firms and another for monitors, rather than just a
single contest  between firms organized by a single super-ordinate  monitoring  body? This
decision is a second-order design choice, not a matter of principle.  Either path might
spark the social performance race just outlined. Indeed, other rolling-rule monitoring
regimes 3 operate with a single monitor. Two considerations,  however, weigh in favor of
multiple competing  monitors for global labor standards.
An array of  monitoring organizations seems more suited to  the  diversity of
production contexts and concerns that any regulatory regime must face. Some monitors
might specialize in  sectors  with  articulated production chains-like  footwear and
electronics-while  others might focus on informal sector activities. These two would
likely develop different data collection, verification, and technical assistance capacities
suited to the particularity  of their regulatory  targets. Furthermore, there is at present an
array of social monitoring and certification  efforts afoot. Some are led by NGOs. others
by accounting  and consulting firms, and a few are run by large multinational  firms, each
utilizing different techniques, concepts, and  approaches. At  this point in  their early
history, no one knows which will tum out to be most effective, and so one reasonable
path  toward RLS is to incorporate  them all into a competitive  social performance  contest.
IV.  RLS BUILDING  BLOCKS  IN THE  FORMAL  SECTOR
Consider  now four social monitoring trends-firm-centered  initiatives,  NGO led
efforts,  partnerships  between  multinational corporations  and  NGOs,  and  public
disclosure-that  might form the building blocks of an RLS. Each is partially flawed  from
the point of view of the design principles we have been discussing.  None, moreover, is
yet connected  to the others in the ways necessary to form an integral  whole. Indeed some
actors treat these developments  as though they were and will remain separate endeavors,
to be pursued independently,  but not integrated.  The gap between the reality and the
regulatory  project is thus large.
3 The U.S.  nuclear power  industry offers  one good  example. See  Joseph Rees (1994).
18But it is also possible to understand  the partially divergent  developments  and the
simultaneous  pursuit of multiple strategies as signs of experimentation  and exploration.
Faced with the urgent need to respond to  a  critical situation, firms and NGOs have
responded  in a wide range of ways, creating a welter of programs and institutions.  These
efforts potentially converge into a unified regulatory regime on the lines suggested.
Mindful of the complexity  and fluidity of the current situation,  we do not suggest  that all
roads lead to RLS. Rather, the RLS principles suggest  a fruitful way to join together  and
reinforce  a stiking set of novel initiatives  that, left in isolation,  could flounder  because  of
their separate  weaknesses  and their partially conflicting  aims.
Firm-Centered  Initiatives
Political pressures and the structure of global production chains has led several
large, high-profile  multinational  footwear and apparel manufacturers  to take steps which
display a number of the features of ratcheting labor standards.  Nike is a case in point.
Over the last six years, Nike has faced increasing public pressure regarding its labor
practices.  A transnational advocacy  network has emerged focusing specifically  on Nike
and its subcontractors.  Almost everywhere  the company  turns, it now faces sophisticated
media campaigns, boycotts, picket lines, and most recently literal rocks through its
windows at "NikeTown" in Seattle during the WTO meetings. The structure  of Nike's
production has also forced the  company to  look to new strategies to  resolve labor
problems  throughout its dispersed subcontractor  networks.  Nike does not own any of the
factories  which manufacture  its sports shoes or apparel. Direct control  and regulation  are
thus not feasible. Instead,  Nike must manage a network of over 350 factories around  the
world (employing approximately 500,000 workers) through incentives, suasion, and
occasional  sanctions. The company  has responded to public pressures  by bringing labor
and environmental  issues into this subcontractor  management  system.
In 1992,  Nike established  a code of conduct on labor and environmental  practices,
and in 1994, began a program of external monitoring.  Subcontractor  compliance  with the
code is monitored  through a program of internal self-evaluation  conducted  first by Nike
staff and factory managers,  and then reviewed by external accounting,  health and safety,
and environmental  consulting firms. Nike has also developed  in-house assessment  tools
19such as its SHAPE program (Safety,  Health, Attitude  of Management,  People Investment,
and Environment) and MESH program (Management,  Enviromnent,  Safety, and Health)
that allow the company to integrate  the evaluation  of labor and enviromnental  issues into
broader  management  practices  and  training.  MESH  resembles  the  ISO  14000
management  auditing program, though it seeks to go further  by evaluating  actual factory
performance (not just whether a subcontractor  has appropriate  management  procedures).
Reebok and Adidas, Nike's  main competitors, as well as companies such as Levi's,
Disney, the Gap, and other prominent  merchandisers,  have established  similar programs
that combine in-house assessment  with audits by consulting  firms. Reebok for instance,
has instituted a worldwide "Human Rights Production Standards Factory Performance
Assessment," while Adidas has implemented  a "Standards  of Engagement  Survey Form
on Health, Safety, and Environment"  for all its subcontractors.
Through these auditing tools, companies like Nike, Reebok, etc. now regularly
rate their subcontractors  for environmental  and labor performance.  In the case of Nike,
points are assigned for the ranking  in each category,  with double weight  given to the two
social-performance  rankings (labor and environment).  Subcontractors  are then told how
they rate against other subcontractors  in the same country. High scorers often gamer
more lucrative orders and low scorers risk losing contracts.  Nike bases these labor and
environmental programs on  long-standing quality control management systems for
evaluating  and ranking subcontractors.  Requirements  to improve labor conditions simply
extend the scope of commitments  agreed to in the code of conduct and subcontractor
Memoranda  of Understanding.  Providing some evidence  that this effort is an earnest one,
Nike has cancelled some  subcontractor  contracts  due to poor social evaluations.
But how much improvement  have Nike's code of conduct and self-monitoring
programs really achieved? Little research exists on the impacts of codes of conduct and
self-monitoring on  actual labor conditions. Nike naturally asserts that  they respond
effectively and sufficiently  to labor concerns.  The company  argued for several years that
it alone (perhaps with the assistance  of a consulting  firm) could solve  its labor problems.
However,  judging by press reports,  human rights NGOs and the general public put little
credence in corporate self-evaluation  and monitoring.  Based upon recent cases in which
codes and monitoring have been used for public relations rather than improving labor
20conditions,  many criticize voluntary  codes and internal  monitoring  for their vulnerability
to corporate manipulation. For example, Nike's early attempts at monitoring involved
audits by poorly trained consultants  from Ernst & Young and guided  tours around their
factories  by former-UN  Ambassador  Andrew Young  (O'Rourke 1997).
To be sure, conflicts of  interest and other drawbacks burden company self-
monitoring.  Their procedures  are rarely transparent  to the public or workers, lack public
accountability,  and provide no basis for comparison  between firms. Quite simply,  NGOs
and even average consumers don't trust firms like Nike to  self-regulate their labor
practices. Without independent  verification  the pubic cannot discern  the truth of Nike's
claims. For those who distrust it, the company's monitoring  initiatives seem designed  to
pacify consumers and avert more serious regulation by masking its repressive labor
practices and anti-union efforts. And even if Nike's claims were substantiated,  it would
still be difficult to evaluate them without a comparison  of Nike's social performance  to
that of its major competitors.
Certifying  Bodies
Public skepticism (and further activist  pressure) has led to a recent profusion of
programs in  the US  and Europe to  establish more independent monitoring through
certified third-parties. Five major initiatives of this type stand out: the US-based Fair
Labor Association  (FLA), the SA8000  program sponsored  by the Council  on Economic
Priorities Accreditation Agency, the  Clean Clothes  Campaign (CCC) monitoring
foundation which operates across Europe, the British-based Ethical Trading Initiative
(ETI), and the US-based Worker  Rights Consortium.  Each of these programs  has a code
of conduct  informed largely  by ILO core standards.  They differ substantially,  however,  in
procedures  for monitoring,  enforcement,  and financing  inspections.
The  Clean  Clothes Campaign (CCC) model  combines many  of  the  most
promising  elements in this certification  trend. In 1998,  the CCC developed  a model code
of  conduct based  on  ILO conventions that applies to  entire subcontracting chains
(including  homeworkers) and then followed up with proposals for monitoring  systems.
Firms who open themselves  to monitoring  and comply  with the CCC code are eligible  to
use a "clean" label. The CCC plans to establish  a foundation  that will certify monitors,
21collect  funds from member  firms, and then pay monitoring  orgamnzations  directly. The
foundation would also  coordinate pilot  studies in different  countries  around  the world,
pool  information on successes and  failures  of the codes  and  monitoring  systems,  and
make information public on the results  of the audits. The  CCC has  forged  agreements
with a number of European retailers and manufacturers and  is now moving forward in its
implementation of this monitoring program.
Other  certifying  bodies  are  competing  to  play  a  similar  role.  The Fair  Labor
Association (FLA), convened by the Clinton administration  in 1996, is the most advanced
and  most  controversial  of  current  initiatives  to  establish  monitoring  and  verification
systems.  SA8000,  created in  1997 by the U.S.  NGO  Council  on  Economic  Priorities
(CEP), is patterned on the ISO family of standards and requires corporations seeking their
stamp of approval to hire certified auditors to  evaluate whether their subcontractors  are
complying  with  the  code of conduct.  The Ethical  Trading  Initiative,  established  by a
British  coalition  in  1998, is  also  developing  a  monitoring  system,  conducting  pilot
studies, organizing training programs for monitors, and building coalitions in developing
countries to carry out verification work. Finally, the Worker Rights Consortium  (WRC),
developed  by  the  United  Students  Against  Sweatshops  (USAS)  in  1999,  employs  a
different  strategy focusing  on information forcing, verification  systems, and  pro-active
inspections.  The WRC differs  from the other four models  in that  it will explicitly  not
certify company compliance with a code of conduct or standard.
W1hile  there are some important differences in the requirements of these programs,
most tend to be based around the ILO's  core standards,  particularly  the prohibitions  on
forced labor, child labor, and discrimination in the workplace.  However, a number of the
NGO-developed  codes  go  much  further  than  the  ILO  in  defining  outcome-based
standards,  such as a "living wage," women's  rights, and fair treatrnent of workers. Even
within  the class of  codes  originating  with NGOs,  there  is  significant  variation  in the
procedures for monitoring and enforcing. USAS and the CCC have sought to establish a
"foundation"  model that centralizes oversight and controls  all payments  for monitoring.
The FLA  and SA8000 employ  a  "consulting  firm"  model  which  allows  companies  to
choose and pay for their own monitors. The various programs  also assign different roles
for  local  NGOs,  unions,  and  other  stakeholders,  have  widely  varying -levels  of
22transparency and public disclosure, and have established a range of systems of sanctions
and penalties.
Corporate-NGO Partnerships
Nike  and  Reebok, who would  appear to  be  natural  foes  of NGOs  or at  least
unlikely  allies,  are also  beginning  to  include  them  in  monitoring  programs.  In  what
appears to be the most in-depth independent assessment of factory conditions for a major
multinational footwear manufacturer,  Reebok commissioned  a local NGO  in Indonesia
(called  IHS)  in  1998 to  conduct  an  audit  of two  factories  producing  its  shoes.  The
assessment  included  over  1400  hours  of  research  inside  the  factories  involving:  (1)
general worker  surveys of 5 percent  of the workforce; (2) in-depth  worker  interviews;
and  (3)  direct  observation  by  experts  on  labor  relations,  occupational  health,  and
women's  issues. The local NGO was given complete access to factory records, workers,
and the shop floor, and granted control over the final, public reporting. This report, titled
"Peduli Hak" ("Caring for Rights")  set the standard for independent auditing  and public
transparency.  Liz  Claiborne,  a  major  women's  clothing  company,  has  established  a
smaller pilot monitoring project with an NGO for one of its Guatemalan factories.
The  Reebok  report  however,  represents  much  more  than just  an  example  of
independent monitoring. The process also served to advance a nascent form of ratcheting
labor standards. The report (and the process behind it) spells  out how problems can be
identified by local actors, feeding new information to subcontractors  and multinational
buyers, and how potential solutions can be jointly identified and implemented. The report
is  a  clear  example  of  a  process  of  independent  information  gathering  and  public
disclosure that can drive improvements in factory conditions.
Nike has responded with an NGO initiative of its own. In collaboration  with the
MacArthur Foundation, the World Bank,  and the International  Youth Foundation, Nike
has established the "Global Alliance for Workers and Communities."  The stated purpose
of the Global Alliance is to gather information on workers'  needs and aspirations in five
areas: workplace conditions, career goals, educational opportunities, health and nutrition,
and linkages with their local community. Based on this assessment, the Global Alliance
plans to address problems in workplace  conditions identified in the surveys, and to fund
23development  projects which meet needs raised by workers (such as life skills taining,
small business development,  etc.). Skeptics fear that the Global Alliance is simply an
attempt to subvert union organizing  by gathering information  on worker grievances  and
then mediating between firms and workers. One international  trade union official has
accused  the Global Alliance of supporting  the worst form of "yellow company unions."4
Despite these  serious concerns, the Global Alliance may yet ratchet labor standards
upward  by raising standards  for worker involvement  and NGO assessment.  As one labor-
rights activist recently asserted, "We have crossed a continental divide when the two
leading sport shoe companies are trying to  outbid each other in the area of improving
labor  rights." 5
Public Disclosure
With  a  growing  student  movement  led  by  the  United  Students  Against
Sweatshops, university administrations have similarly been forced to  take action to
evaluate and improve the conditions of the factories that produce university-logo  goods.
Students  across the US have won public disclosure  agreements from their administrations
which require licensees to disclose factory locations. This relatively recent demand for
public disclosure has been surprisingly successful (and would have not have been
predicted  even two years ago). Over 30 universities have now pledged to require public
disclosure  of factory locations  by the subcontractors  producing  their goods. Thus far, five
major firms (Nike, Champion, Jansport, Gear for Sports, and Eastpack) have publicly
disclosed  their subcontractor  locations producing university  goods and more are lik'ely  to
follow suit in the  coming months. The next challenge is to  establish procedures and
systems  that monitor these far-flung  networks of subcontractors.
Limitations and Future Directions
These seemingly convergent developments represent innovative strategies of
formal  sector producers and NGOs to expand the coverage  of codes  of conducts and labor
standards,  deepen the credibility  of monitoring and enforcement,  and to more effectively
4 Keamey,  Neil,  "Letter  to the  Editor,"  Financial  Times  of London,  January  31,  2000.
24identify problems  and  prioritize  solutions.  Recent  initiatives  involve  a  wide range of
actors, including merchandising multinationals,  subcontracting producers, public-private
partnerships  to  establish  oversight  and  certification  bodies,  and  NGOs  and  workers
themselves.  Taken  together,  these  initiatives  offer  the  potential  for  gathering  new
information and  learning  from  experiences  of  local  implementation,  and  for  creating
multiple mechanisms  and  incentives to  improve  working  conditions across production
chains.
Unfortunately,  these initiatives  still  lack critical  inter-connections.  Though they
all proceed-from  the obvious common  concem  for labor conditions, each has different
goals, techniques, and approaches that have to date operated separately from one another.
If RLS moves  forward, it will do so by  building  upon the  achievements  of these and
related programs and incorporating them into a larger frame of comparison. That, in tun.,
requires these thus far independent programs  to pool the results of their efforts so that the
public has some basis on which to gauge the seriousness and merits of each and so each
can learn from the successes of the other. Borrowing from software development, another
field that is deeply concerned with compatibility while nevertheless preserving a diversity
of approaches,  current  corporate  and  independent  monitoring  efforts  should be  made
"interoperable"  with  one another.  "Users"  of one  regime,  be  they consumers,  MNCs,
supplier firms, or national regulatory  agencies,  should be  able to compare performance
measurements, rankings, and techniques with those of other monitoring regimes. There is
no straightforward path to interoperability, but consider two alternatives.
One path might begin by developing  a set of basic metrics, perhaps derived from
the concerns that drive the ILO's core labor standards, on which the results of production
facilities  and  their  monitoring  agents  could  be  compared.  Such  basic  metrics  might
include wage levels (perhaps as a function  of regional prevailing wages), workforce age
profiles, turnover, health  and  safety outcomes, worker  satisfaction, worker  association,
and the like.  As participants  in RLS,  monitoring  bodies  would add the collection and
reporting  of  these  metrics  to  the  other  functions  they  presently  performs.  Some
centralized  coordinating  body-perhaps  convened  by  a  reputable  international
5Bissell,  Trim,  'Nile, Reebok  Compete  to Set Labor Rights  Pace," unpublished  manuscript,  Canpaign for
Labor  Rights, March  25, 1999.
25organization such as the World Bank or the ILO-would  then compile these metrics,
generate rankings from them, and then publicize  these results. Since such metrics provide
only a thin basis of information,  we imagine  that the participants,  perhaps  organized in a
standards govemance body, would constantly  revise the set of basic metrics to make it
more useful and reflective of underlying labor conditions, and then also increase its
sophistication  by adding process  and implementation  considerations.
An  alternative might focus on particular industrial sectors, like footwear or
apparel. This approach begins with the recognition  that workers in different sectors face
very  different working  conditions and  problems that  stem  from the  location and
organization or  those  sectors, and that these considerations constitute the  relevant
boundaries for comparisons. Here, the most forward  NGOs, MNCs, and monitors might
form a governance and standards body to deliberate  about the merits and effectiveness  of
the labor improvements strategies that they each pursue, and then generate rankings of
production facilities, MNCs, and monitoring  regimes based upon those deliberations.  To
be credible and actionable by national regulatory agencies, consumers, and advocacy
organizations,  the methodologies,  justifications,  and rankings  themselves  would of course
be publicly available.
Interoperability and transparency  would be further enhanced by the  systemic
pooling of these monitoring results in a centralized  and publicly accessible knowledge
base, similar to the Toxics Release  Inventory  (TRI)  or NGO sponsored  scorecard  projects
in the United States. A prestigious  International  Financial  Institution  like the World Bank
might house such a knowledge  base and the deliberations  that govern its generation and
use. Such an institutional home would lend RLS a level of legitimacy and technical
capability  that far exceeds that of current  monitoring  efforts.
Furthermore, RLS ultimately  requires  mechanisms  that motivate  laggard firms to
open themselves to  evaluation and to participate  in monitoring systems and certifying
associations. Certainly, firms like Nike will put upward pressure on other competing
firms to participate, but also most certainly,  there will be firms that attempt  to opt out of a
system of RLS. Some range of sanctions  and incentives  might motivate these firms to
participate, including: national regulatory sanctions for firms that do not participate,
support of consumer and advocacy campaigns  to pressure firms to participate, national
26market-based  mechanisms  to  incentivize participation,  and  international  trade
mechanisms  that motivate  participation.
If RLS gains momentum,  these sanctions  will be supplemented  by incentives  for
large corporations  to follow the lead of Nike and Reebok in establishing  their own labor
monitoring and improvement practices that are integrated in their mainstream supplier
development and management  systems. In the long term, they will realize that social
performance will become its own basis of competition  and labor monitoring programs
will become a necessary element of success,  just as quality improvement programs are
taken for granted today. In the short term, they will realize that their own internal
monitors will in  many cases have a  deeper understanding of  particular production
practices  than  an  outside  independent  monitor,  and  so  internally  generated
recommendations for improvement will likely be more effective in  achieving social
inprovements and more compatible  with other production considerations.  Since RLS
compels them to  adopt independent monitoring unless they establish a comparably
effective  internal alternative,  many will seek  the latter route.
V.  BUILDING RLS FOUNDATIONS  IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR
Though  the principles of ratcheting  regulation  can apply to the informal sector as
well, its  development must attend three crucial differences. First,  informal sector
institutions lack the expansive capacities of firms that operate in the global economy.
Unllike  Nike, Reebok, and their suppliers,  informal-sector  firms operating on the margins
of solvency typically lack both the resources and know-how to  improve their social
performance. Therefore, an effective regulatory  regime must begin by building these
capacities for monitoring and betterment. Second,  most informal sector activity is not
well connected to developed country consumers  and their governments.  These actors'
demands for good labor practices motivated  the development of RLS building blocks
such as SA8000 and the Nike initiatives,  but these drivers are unavailable in informal
production contexts.  And third, the informal  sector  often melds community  and economy
- often bringing production into peoples' homes and communities.  Given this proximity,
grassroots organizations can sometimes motivate informal sector social performance
improvements  through local campaigns.  Just as consumer  and producer pressure drives
27regulatory  reform in the formal sector, community  pressure can drive it in the informal
one. These same organizations can enable labor practice imnprovements  by  providing
technical  know how, connecting  into local social norms and networks, and providing  the
motivation  to make changes.
Conditions in the informal sector are most accessible to reform when highly
capable firms operating in the global economy are motivated to  connect to  informal
sector producers and to assist these firms to  improve. For example, Nike, anxious to
escape  the problems  of production in Bangkok, Thailand,  decided  to subcontract stitching
of uppers-to  an NGO-managed  project employing  women in outlying villages.  To guard
against abusive practices from the start, as well as to  ensure a dedicated and reliable
workforce,  Nike worked with a Thai NGO, Population and Community Development
Association,  to build the  capacity of these rural women workers and to  ensure that
working  conditions  in the new plants meet corporate  standards. Operators like these, who
sirultaneously  occupy both the formal and informal spheres, are  susceptible to  the
formal  sector RLS designs  described  in the previous  section.
But most informal operators  lack these direct linkages to global firms. Therefore
capacities to  imnprove  social performance in  areas  such  as  labor  standards  and
environment  must be built up from diverse and scattered sources. Several recent projects
aimed at  improving the  environmental performance of  small firms  in  developing
economies illustrates these challenges. In these cases, capacity building depends on
complex and fragile alliances that span not only the boundaries between formal and
informal sectors, but frequently bridge national boundaries as well.  Even the most
schematic presentation of promising informal sector regulatory projects reveals the
complexity  of the problems  of institutional  coordination  required to build these alliances.
In Guadalajara,  Mexico, for example, a group of eleven large firms teamed with
the national Ministry of Environment,  Natural Resources and Fisheries (SEMARNAP),
the World Bank, local research institutes, university researchers, as  well as  private
consultants  to school their small suppliers in environmental  management systems based
on ISO 14000.  Over the course of this project, suppliers  completed  nearly all the required
planning  tasks and implemented  nearly half of the plans. Unsurprising in light of the
marginal  positions they occupy, project evaluators  concluded that success depended on
28"substantial  implementation  support," including  provision of staff to translate the overall
project into achievable  tasks (World  Bank 1999).
Similarly, a project to reduce the emissions of some 300 small brick kilns in
Ciudad  Juarez, Mexico, by switching  to propane  fuel, involved  an extraordinary  coalition
of public  and private groups:  FEMAP,  an NGO with experience  in grass-roots  organizing
in the poor neighborhood  where the kilns, and their some 2,000 employees, are located;
PRONASOL, the  micro-enterprise arm  of  the  solidarity program of  the  Salinas
administration  (interested  to demonstrate  its concern for environmental  conditions along
the US, Mexican border), which provided funding; extension agents from Monterrey
Tech and the Ciudad Juarez Campus  as well as propane  gas companies  there and from El
Paso  Natural Gas across the border, who advised on technical problems of switching to
propane;  experts from Los Alamos National Laboratory in New Mexico, who tried to
achieve dramatic fuel efficiencies  through affordable redesign of the traditional brick
kilns. Rival trade unions representing  different groups of highly organized brick makers
as well as rival  community-based  organizations defending the interests of particular
neighborhood  participated less directly.  Despite the ample resources and high political
priority it enjoyed locally,  nationally  and even internationally,  the project failed to switch
the sector to propane, much less to  adopt new kiln designs. Brickmakers used their
political  clout to resist requirements  that they pay the higher costs of this alternative fuel.
However, community pressure did move them to abandon the dirtiest and most toxic
fuels, such as waste plastic (Blackman  and Bannmeister  1998).
Improvement of social performance in the informal sector is likely to require a
complex,  and therefore institutiionally  demanding,  web of complementary  capacities. The
problem of child labor is a case  in point For example,  projects in India and Pakistan have
shown that child labor can effectively  be eliminated  by paying an amount equal to the
child's daily wage (between  50 cents and one dollar) to his or her mother (re-enforcing
her status in the family, and decreasing  the chance that the income is squandered), on
condition that the child's teacher report a school-attendance  record of, say 90 percent
(insuring that  the  child  receives sufficient education to  provide access to  decent
employment,  and thus essentially  eliminate  the temptation  to impose  child labor on their
future offspring). These projects succeed by  establishing intricate alliances between
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bureaucracies,  and donor institutions able to compensate  mothers for the wages forgone
by their children.
Community  involvement-on  the local, national, and even international  levels-
is thus crucial  to regulatory  reform in the informal sector. Standard  regulatory  regimnes-
which suppose  capacities that frequently  do not exist and overlook connections  that must
be established  to build them-are  almost sure to fail. Even ratcheting regimes, open as
they are, will strain to achieve  their regulatory ends. If the cases  just presented  offer any
guide,  the first step is to foster the capacity of local organizations  to mobilize support in
the  community and  within firms for the  improvement of  social performance. Such
capacity building will typically go hand in hand with exploration of possibilities of
working with a range of national and international organizations  to define and execute
projects. Institutions, ranging from international NGOs to the World Bank, which are
already explicitly or indirectly helping to build the kind of organizations  that can link
economic,  community and social development can help to organize these initial efforts.
Many transnational  NGOs, local community-based  organizations,  and trade union groups
might, especially if  supported with the appropriate technical assistance, take on the
monitoring of  informal production facilities as  part of  their missions to  enhance
conditions  for communities,  workers, women, or the environment.  Wages  and workplace
conditions  have always been central to each of these concerns,  and so monitoring  would
be a natural extension  of many NGO and union activities.
The next step is to connect  these efforts so that they can learn from one another,
inventory existing initiatives, and establish mechanisms for culling and diffusing best
practices.  Community-focussed  transnational networks  such as Global Exchange and the
"Women in  Informal Employment Globalizing and  Organizing" (WIEGO) project,
already  build such linkages, and so offer a sound base in this activity area. An informal
sector  RLS rating system-for  both informal  sector operators  and GSOs that monitor and
seek to improve them-might  grow out of these or allied networking  initiatives as a way
to  more systematically leam from their diverse experiences. Given the diversity of
activities and circumstances  causally grouped under the "informal" heading, any such
knowledge-base  must be built one bit at a time, perhaps by beginning with fractional
30categories such as home-workers  that supply particular portions  of the apparel industry.
In this respect,  however, informal  sector RLS would mirror progress  in the formal sector,
where independent  monitoring  efforts may incrementally  contribute  to an formal sector
RLS knowledge  base.
VI.  TOWARD  RATCHETING  LABOR  STANDARDS
So far we have focussed on the way that MNCs, NGOs, consumers and other
public groups, and international  organizations  could create a coherent scheme of labor
regulation  based on four basic norms: transparency,  performance  comparison,  continuous
improvement,  and sanction  for misbehavior.  However,  we have said little about the role
of  parties in  the  traditional systems of  labor  regulation that are  being  eroded by
contemporary globalization: trade  unions  and  national governments. By  way  of
conclusion we review the principles and show how they can coherently inform the
choices  of these actors as well.
First and foremost, RLS requires a high degree of transparency  and disclosure
from both producers and monitors. Odd as it may seem, disclosure  of factory locations,
labor  standards  audits,  performance  rankings  and  outcomes,  and  monitoring
methodologies,  is a novel, sometimes  contentious  demand in the labor standards debate.
Until now that debate has largely revolved around whether labor standards should be
strictly policed or voluntaristic, and more or less encompassing,  rather than on actual
labor practices and outcomes in the global economy. Since RLS begins from current
practices and  formulates goals based upon them, it  relies much more heavily on
information compilation, analysis, and dissemination.  In  RLS, consumers, advocacy
groups, and national regulators depend upon this actual labor practices and monitoring
techniques  to identify laggards in labor practices and to exert pressure on them. Though
the detailed meaning of transparency  must be worked out in the course of institutional
construction,  even in bare-bones  form the requirement  provides  a useful guide to action,
as the examples  of MNCs and supplier  monitoring  show.
Transparency makes possible comparison, which is the second norm of RLS.
Companies,  governments,  pressure groups,  and publics should  base their assessments  of
labor outcomes  and management  practices not upon absolute  thresholds or prohibitions.
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to achieve  with respect  to factors such as wages, child labor, workplace  health and safety,
workforce organization,  and discrimination.  This norm imposes a burden on companies
to justify their own levels of performance  with respect to leaders and to incorporate  labor
considerations  into their supplier  choices.
Continuous  improvement,  the third RLS norm, focuses regulation  and the efforts
of regulated entities upon increases in  labor practice and other dimensions of social
improvement  rather than satisfying  fixed thresholds  such as a particular  living wage level
or various prohibitions.  The norm requires producers to seek (and publicly explain how
they are doing so) novel ways to improve their labor performance  outcomes on various
dimensions. Community and labor groups might press producers who lack them to
establish such inprovement systems, or participate in  improvement procedures where
appropriate.
RLS is not a voluntary system, and the fourth norm specifies the basis of its
sanctions. Generally,  formal (e.g. legal penalization), associational (e.g. expulsion from
accreditation regimnes  such as  the  Clean Clothes Campaign), and informal (public
pressure and corporate  campaigns)  sanctions and rewards should be applied according  to
the norms of transparency  and continuous improvement.  On the former, firms  that fail to
disclose their labor outcomes or join  a monitoring regime tha.t does so  should be
presumed to  have something to hide, and be punished for violating the first norm.
Regarding the latter norm, truly recalcitrant firms, deserving of the harshest castigation
that the regime can offer, are those who have been identified as laggards in labor
performance  and fail to adopt improvement  measures  that have proven effective  for their
peers.
New Roles and Responsibilities
What, then, of the traditional actors in labor discussions such as the ILO, trade
unions, and nation-states?  What roles might they play in RLS?
Clearly,  the ILO, in collaboration  with the World  Bank, would be indispensable  to
RLS  in  underwriting the  centralized pooling of  social performance knowledge and
coordinating its  governance. No  other  institutions have  the  global authority and
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monitoring  efforts  and  social  partnerships  in  specific  countries  or  regions  as  RLS
demonstration projects. They might coax national governments to adopt RLS-compatible
labor law by developing model legislation and intemational covenants. Convictions aside,
these institutions might be drawn  to support this regulatory  altemative  because it frees
them from adjudicatory responsibilities  they are ill equipped to handle, while allowing
them to participate in the articulation of feasible standards according to principles they
know from the arenas of economic development and trade: transparency and competition.
Some national governments,  especially those  of  developing countries  that have
suffered  imperialism,  may be  more  reluctant to  adopt  RLS on the  grounds that  it, or
indeed any external labor standard, impinges upon their territorial sovereignty. Perhaps.
But it is worth observing  that it is often these very  same countries that  locate foreign
firms  and sometimes their subcontractors  in extraterritorial "free-trade  zones"  today. If
these zones are to be subject to the law of the market, then consistency demands they be
subject to the full information and comparisons of RLS.
Altematively,  many  nations  might  find  RLS  attractive  as  an  international
regulatory scheme and adopt it as their own. The usual objection of developing nations to
international labor and environmental minimums-that  they will drive capital to nations
that already implement these minimums or to those who flaunt them-would  not apply to
the open RLS system. Its standards, after all, are based upon the best feasible practices,
always  taking  context  into  account,  of  combining  social  protection  and  productive
activity. That objection mooted, governments might embrace RLS in several ways. They
might require  firms  operating  in  their jurisdictions  to  participate in  RLS  by selecting
internationally  certified  monitors.  Administratively,  they  might build  RLS monitoring
capacities in their own labor agencies.  Or, they might use the RLS knowledge base to
formulate  minimum  labor  standards  that  they  then  promulgate  through  national
legislation. While neither path offers a definitive resolution of the tensions between RLS
and  national  sovereignty,  these  points  of  departure  perhaps  render  the  conflict  less
insuperable.
RLS would by no means completely replace national systems of labor regulation.
Rather,  RLS  would  supplement  existing  systems  of  regulation,  shine  light  on  the
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improvements  in regulatory  and management strategies.  Firms will of course still face a
bottom-line requirement of complymg with national standards.  However, leading firms
will  seek  to  move  beyond compliance and  beyond  their  competitors in  social
performance. If designed and taken up strategically,  RLS would complement and help
advance  national  regulatory systems.
Countries may of course choose to oppose (or ignore) RLS. Non-participation
would  however entail costs. Advocates  will raise questions about why a country seeks to
hide its labor regulation and performance  from comparison.  And consumer groups and
unions may even advance campaigns  or boycotts of production in countries  that fail to
meet RLS-style  transparency  requirements.
Finally, RLS would benefit enormously  from the contributions  of powerful trade
unions. Organized workplaces might prove to be the most capable social monitors and
agents of continuous improvement and worker organizations among the staunchest of
allies in national and international  advocacy for RLS. Conversely,  RLS would confer
substantial  capabilities and points of leverage upon trade unions. As a transparent and
encompassing  knowledge-base,  RLS would enable trade unions to enhance their own
knowledge  of best labor practices  world-wide  and to constantly  update  that knowledge  as
new trends emerge in sectors or regions. It would also enable them to effectively  deploy
this knowledge in the service of improving the treatment of workers. RLS would allow
them to lodge challenges  to workplace  practices or regional standards  simply  by pointing
out how their own methods, or those of private sector leaders elsewhere, are feasible yet
demonstrably  superior. Based as it is upon social competition,  RLS would  thus empower
such worker groups to  compel laggards to  improve. These two features-knowledge
generation  and opportunities for legally-backed  challenges to exposed laggards-enable
robust trade union  strategies for conducting corporate campaigns against the  most
egregious  firms on one hand, and for improving workplaces  through  the diffusion  of best
practices  on the other.
The progress  of  Ratcheting Labor  Standards now  depends largely  on  the
willingness of  these  powerful parties in  the  private, non-governmental, state,  and
international  sectors to adopt perspectives  and measures  along these lines. A testament to
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established  and currently in play, were built without such understanding  and deliberate
action. Rather, they emerged as local, provisional responses to  political and market
pressures  taken in the context of global  production  dynamics.  Those actors, concemed as
they are with enhancing  the welfare  of workers  in global  production,  must now digest the
lessons of these recent developments  to reformulate  their advocacy, management, and
regulatory strategies. We have offered RLS as a crystallization  of those lessons into a
regulatory  alternative that is more promising  than the main approaches  of either fixed-
rules or voluntary codes. In the end, RLS attempt to seize an important opportunity to
hamess the distinctive cultural, legal, and economic features of present globalization
processes  for the sake of social goals.
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Core Labor Standards
Since its inception  in 1919, the Intemational  Labour Organization  has developed
conventions defining acceptable labor practices, sought ratification from its member
nations (now  174 countries), provided guidance on  implementing the  conventions
through national laws, and managed a monitoring  and reporting process for all member
countries.  To date, the ILO has formulated 182  conventions, most of which are detailed,
narrow in scope,  and have been ratified by only a minority of member countries.
Recently,  however,  the ILO has begun to emphasize fewer and broader standards
as its primary strategy for promoting better labor conditions.  In 1995,  the ILO initiated  a
campaign to promote the ratification of seven core conventions.  Three years later it
adopted a "Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work," which asks
member countries  to reaffirm  the universal  respect for core workers' rights regardless  of
whether  they have ratified  the specific  conventions  relating to each right.
This new emphasis assimilates labor standards to what are generally considered
basic human  rights: protections  that persons enjoy because of their humanity,  irrespective
of their home country's  level of  development.  Thus  core  standards are  explicitly
differentiated  from other types of outcome-based  or substantive  standards,  such as levels
of wages or other social  protections, that might be expected to vary with the prosperity  of
a country.
The core  labor standards  include:
- Freedom  of association  (ILO Convention  No. 87);
- The right to organize  and bargain collectively  (Convention  No. 98);
- Prohibition  of forced labor (Conventions  No. 29 and No. 105);
- Prohibition of child labor (Convention 138, 1LO Recommendation  No.  146, and
Convention  No. 182  on the "Worst Forms of Child Labour");
- Equality of treatment and non-discrimination  in employment (Conventions  No. 111
and 100).
120 member countries have  now  ratified at  least  five  of  the  seven  ILO
conventions  supportng these core standards.  All 174  member countries  have stated their
commitment  to respect the basic standards outlined in the "Declaration of Fundamental
Principles and Rights at Work" adopted at the ILO's annual conference in June, 1998.
However, little has been done thus far at the national level to promulgate laws and
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unaided, will give force to the declared aspirations are  bleak: By itself, the ILO itself has
very  weak  monitoring  and  enforcement  capacities.  The  worst  sanction  the  ILO  can
currently impose is to establish a commission of inquiry to look into abuses of workers'
rights.  The ILO is not even authorized to use shaming tactics  to name countries which
breach  basic  worker  rights.  The  only  member  state  ever  to  be  expelled  from  the
organization for labor abuses is South Africa under apartheid.
Out of humanitarian concem and the recognition that public concems about labor
abuses can sway domestic debate against extension of free trade, governments in the US
and the EU have begun to lend their authority to the movement towards  core standards,
and to explore ways of improving the capacity to ensure respect for them.  Four strategies
are being pursued to advance core standards:
*  Strengthening the capacity of the ILO to  implement  and  monitor specific  standards
(such as child labor provisions). The US recently pledged  to increase funding to the
ILO by $25 million for these purposes.
*  Strengthening the capacity of developing  country agencies  to  monitor  and enforce
national regulations. The US has also pledged to increase aid to developing  countries
to implement and enforce core standards.
e  Establishing  incentive  systems  and  enforcement  programs  which  operate
independently  of the ILO. For  example, the  US  and  EU  have used  their  General
System  of  Preferences  (GSP)  to  pressure  individual  countries  to  improve  labor
standards  and enforcement. Under  the US  system,  tariff-free  access is removed  if
countries fail to comply with specific  labor standards.  Under the European system,
countries win  lower GSP tariffs if they meet  standards  on freedom  of association,
collective bargaining, and elimination of child and forced labor.
Incorporating core standards into the World Trade Organization and the programs of
International  Financial Institutions. For example, the US  and France have  recently
advanced  proposals to  include a  "social  clause"  in  the  WTO.  However,  powerful
interests  (from  the  IMF,  to  developing  country  governments,  to  multinational
37corporations) have allied themselves against these efforts to link trade with social
concerns.
Voluntary codes of conduct can be thought of partly as complements,  partly as
substitutes  for this ensemble  of strategies.
Voluntary  Codes of Conduct and Independent Monitoring
Voluntary corporate codes of  conduct are the fruiit of  long debate. The UN
Commission on Transnational Corporations (UNCTC), created in  1975, drafted a UN
Code of  Conduct on Transnational Corporations. The agency tried for  12 years to
promulgate a code requiring corporate disclosure of potential dangers of products and
processes, non-discrimination in  the  workplace, and  a  range of  other  labor  and
environmental  measures. Lobbying  by transnational  corporations  and direct  opposition  by
the Reagan  administration  and the Japanese govermment  blocked  the code, and  in time the
entire agency was dismantled. The OECD and ILO also developed  voluntary codes of
conduct  for  multinational  corporations  in  the  1970s.  Neither  was  effectively
implemented.
Codes  of  conduct  resurfaced  in  the  1990s  as  a  strategy for  motivating
improvements in  the  performance  of  MNCs.  A  number  of  non-governmental
organizations  have worked to revive the UTNCTC  code and to advance other voluntary
codes through  the G-8 and the OECD.  But in both the US and Europe,  NGOs are now at
the forefront of efforts to develop entirely new institutions (some non-governmental,
some  public-private  partnerships)  to advance codes and to define institutional  procedures
to monitor compliance with them. Increased pressure by labor and human rights groups
has also motivated a growing number of multinaional corporations  to adopt their own
codes of conduct and to submit  to external  monitoring.
Four of the most important  initiatives are the Fair Labor Association,  SA8000,  the
Clean Clothes Campaign  foundation,  and the Ethical Trading Initiative.
The Fair Labor Association (FLA).  In 1996, the Clinton administration  convened  the
Apparel Industry Partnership (AIP) to "ensure that the products  companies  make and
sell are manufactured under decent and humane working conditions,  and to develop
options to  inform consumers that the  products they buy are not produced under
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and Principles for Monitoring," which includes provisions for freedom of association
and  collective  bargaining  and  a  process  for  developing  a  system  of  independent
external  monitoring.  In  the  fall  of  1998, the  AIP  evolved  into  the  Fair  Labor
Association  (FLA)  which  is the body  now responsible for  establishing monitoring
criteria,  certifying  monitors,  reviewing  audits,  granting  "sweat-free"  labels,  and
reporting  on  audit  results.  FLA  members  include  Nike,  Reebok, Liz  Claiborne,
Patagonia, Levi's,  Adidas, Kathie Lee Gifford, LL Bean, Nicole Miller, Phillips Van-
Heusen, the Lawyers  Committee  for Human Rights, the International Labor Rights
Fund, the RFK  Memorial Center for Human Rights, the National Consumers League
and  over  100  US  universities.  Notably,  several  union  and  NGO members  of  the
original AIP walked out of the organization when it evolved into the FLA in protest
of  what  they  believed  was  insurmountable  flaws  in  the  organization  and  its
monitoring procedures.
*  SA8000, created  in 1997 by the US NGO Council on Economic Priorities (CEP), is
patterned on the ISO family of standards and includes the core ILO conventions and a
number  of  additional  provisions  on  wages  and  work  hours. It  seeks to  motivate
multinational  firms  and their  subcontractors to  agree to a code of conduct and to  a
system  of  inspections.  CEP  designed  the  code  and  also  created the  Council  on
Econornic  Priorities  Accreditation  Agency  (CEPAA)  to  officially certify  fu-ms as
capable  of  performing  competent  social  audits. Corporations  seeking the  SA8000
stamp of approval  hire certified auditors to evaluate whether their subcontractors are
complying  with  the  code  of  conduct,  and  then  CEP  publicizes  the  results.
Approximately 30 firms have been certified under SA8000 as of January 2000.
*  The Clean Clothes Campaign (CCC), with members throughout Europe, developed a
1998  model  code  of  conduct  based  on  ILO  conventions  that  applies  to  entire
subcontracting  chains (including  homeworkers).  Firms  who comply with the  code
would be eligible to use a label showing they are a "clean"  firm. The CCC plans to
establish  a foundation that  will certify monitors, collect funds from member firms,
and then pay monitoring organizations directly. The foundation would also coordinate
pilot  studies in  different countries around the world, pool information on successes
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results of the audits. The CCC has forged agreements with a number of European
retailers and manufacturers  and is now moving forward in its implementation  of this
monitoring  program.
*  The Worker Rights  Consortiun (WRC) was developed by  the  United Students
Against Sweatshops (USAS) in  cooperation with  UNITE, the  AFL-CIO, and  a
number  of human rights, labor, and religious  NGOs in 1999.  The WRC  employs three
broad strategies: (1) information  forcing; (2) verification systems; and (3) pro-active
inspections.  The WRC  requires  members  to commit  to broad public disclosure and to
mechanisms to  verify information  reported by  companies and their workers. The
WRC will also support  investigations  by NGOs and human  rights groups  in countries
of concem. The WRC however,  is explicitly  not going to certify company  compliance
with a code of conduct  or standard
T  The Ethical Trading Initiative is a coalition of NGOs, labor unions, and businesses
that was convened by the British govemment in 1998. It has established a "Base
Code" of  conduct and monitoring system and  is  now conducting pilot  studies,
organizing training programs for monitors, and building coalitions in  developing
countries to  carry out verification work. The ETI is committed to testing various
models for  inspections and verification of  standards and  for  local stakeholder
participation.
While there  are some important differences in  the  codes advanced in  these
programs, most tend to  be based around the  ILO's  core standards, particularly the
prohibitions  on forced labor, child labor, and discrimination  in the workplace.  Few codes
developed  by corporations are as specific  as ILO conventions, and many omit important
requirements on freedom of association  and collective bargaining. Many of the NGO-
developed  codes go much further  than the ILO in defining outcome-based  standards, such
as a "living wage" and fair treatment  of workers.
Even within the  class of  codes originating with NGOs, there is  significant
variation  in the procedures for monitoring  and enforcing.  The CCC and more recently the
United Students  Against Sweatshops  have sought to establish a "foundation" model that
centralizes oversight and controls all payments for monitoring. The FLA and SA8000
40employ a "consulting firn" model which allows companies to choose and pay for their
own monitors. The different programs also assign different roles for local NGOs, unions,
and other stakeholders, have widely varying levels of transparency and public disclosure,
and have established a range of systems of sanctions and penalties.
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Ratcheting  Labor  Standards  (RLS)  is  a regulatory  alternative  that  aims  to
improve  the  social  performance  of  firms  in  the  global  economy.  Under
RLS,  firms  disclose  to  a certified  monitor  information  on  their  social
performance,  minimally  including  working  conditions,  hours,  and  wages.
The  monitors  rank  firms  on  the  basis  of  their  current  social  performance
and  their  rates  of  improvement  and  make  these  rankings,  and  the  methods
on  which  they  are  based,  accessible  to  the  public.  This  process,  it is
argued,  encourages  leading  firms  to  strive  toward  superior  social
practices.  Competition  among  firms  and  monitors  will help  establish
two  kinds  of  standards:  best  practices  defined  by  the  most  advanced
firms  and  rates  of improvement  shown  to be  feasible  at various  levels
of  development.  Both  continually  "ratchet"  upward  as  the  bestpractices
get  better  still  and  firms  find  ways  to  accelerate  improvement,  in a race
to  the  top.  These  and  other  RLS  mechanisms  would  create  incentives  for
firms  to  dedicate  a portion  of  the  ingenuity  and  resources  now  devoted
to  product  development  to  the  continuous  improvement  of  labor  practices.
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